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In a simple open EME macromodel, calibrated to the typical institutions and shocks of a 
densely populated emerging market economy, a monetary stimulus preceding a 
temporary supply shock can lower interest rates, raise output, appreciate exchange rates, 
and lower inflation. Simulations generalize the analytic result with regressions validating 
the parameter values. Under correct incentives, such as provided by a middling exchange 
rate regime, which imparts limited volatility to the nominal exchange rate around a trend 
competitive rate, forex traders support the policy. The policy is compatible with political 
constraints and policy objectives, but analysis of strategic interactions brings out cases 
where optimal policy will not be chosen. Supporting institutions are required to 
coordinate monetary, fiscal policy and markets to the optimal equilibrium. The analysis 
contributes to understanding the key issues for countries such as India and China that 
need to deepen markets in order to move to more flexible exchange rate regimes.   
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1. Introduction 
We  examine  the  incentive  properties  of  the  exchange  rate  in  the  context  of  the 
institutional  structure  of  an  emerging  market  economy  (EME)  with  high  population 
density
1.  The analysis contributes to understanding the key issues for countries such as 
India and China that need to deepen markets in order to move to more flexible exchange 
rate regimes.  
 
Exchange  rates  have  to  adjust  to  changes  in  the  economy,  but  excessive  movements 
unrelated  to  fundamentals  cause  problems.  Equally  a  rigid  nominal  rate  has  adverse 
effects. While variability is all right excess volatility is not. We will argue that some 
variability  may  prevent  excessive  volatility.  Specifically  we  will  explore  if  monetary 
policy (i) can impart limited volatility to the nominal exchange rate (ii) its potential to 
reduce the endogenous amplification of the effects of volatile capital flows and (iii) and 
allow a smoother and more countercyclical interest rate that makes it possible to better 
utilize capital flows.  
 
Forex markets have a tendency towards excessive movement, as market participants tend 
to  follow  each  other.  Hedging  removes  the  effect  of  currency  movement  in  any  one 
direction  on  profits  by  creating  exposure  in  the  opposite  direction.  Limited  two-way 
movement improves incentives for hedging and therefore reduces exposure to currency 
risk.  No hedge can cover a currency crisis, but if participants are hedging irregular small 
movements,  one-way  bets  that  could  otherwise  magnify  the  movements  will  reduce. 
Since the number of agents whom a change in the nominal exchange rate affects falls 
market  stability  rises.  The  incentives  created  for  forex  market  players  may  reduce 
endogenous amplification of exchange rate volatility.  
 
The policy combination will be credible if it improves real fundamentals in the economy. 
It will do this if the variation in the exchange rate allows interest rates to respond to the 
                                                            
1 See Willett (2004) for an argument that a fixed nominal exchange rate cannot successfully constrain or 
discipline macroeconomic policy, as it was expected to in Latin America. But incentives from exchange 
rate regimes are important in the context of domestic politics. In this paper we explore the incentives the 
exchange rate generates for market players, and its compatibility with political imperatives.     2 
domestic cycle and contributes towards lowering inflation through affecting the price of 
imports. Since inflation is a very sensitive political issue and it has been controlled in 
ways that have imposed large distortions and costs on society, this function will enhance 
the political feasibility of the policy. Although politics is about power, conflicts and re-
distribution, it is also about solving the collective action problem to yield a potential 
surplus. An exchange rate regime suited to structure and rigidities can reduce waste and 
improve coordination.  
   
The strategic interaction, payoffs and incentives of market players and the central banker 
are carefully examined in a market microstructure model plus a small open economy 
model
2.  The  latter  has  an  aggregate  demand  function,  a  money  demand  function,  a 
Phillips  curve,  and  an  interest  arbitrage  condition,  but  each  component  incorporates 
features  of  the  EME.  Structural  features  such  as  wage-price  rigidities,  high  potential 
output but short-term bottlenecks are built in. Forward-looking aspects come in largely 
through the exchange rate. Forex traders are modeled in a market microstructure model 
following Bhattacharya and Weller (1997), Lyons (2001) Ghosh, A.R. (2002) and Jeanne 
and Rose (2002). While Jeanne and Rose focus on the entry decisions we focus on the 
actions and incentives of the traders. Analytical results obtained in a simplified version 
with restrictions on parameters, and are confirmed through simulations and sensitivity 
analysis with the full model. Some estimation also justifies the chosen calibration. 
 
The Central Bank’s optimization, given the constraints from the macromodel, is an input 
into the micro market participant optimization and vice versa. The outcome can be self-
enforcing under certain parameter values, which we explore by solving for the outcome 
of  interaction  between  the  central  bank  and  the  market  players.  The  outcome  of  the 
strategic interactions suggests macro policy  rules or institutions that may bring about 
optimal outcomes in the context of the economic structure. 
 
                                                            
2 New Keynesian Economics literature has developed a number of such models, where forward looking 
behavior is combined with price rigidities. Svensson (2000) was a seminal paper, even though his focus 
was on inflation targeting.    3 
The analysis makes it possible to construct an analytical narrative about actual policy 
choices in India’s post-reform period and is evaluated according to the criteria suggested 
by Bates et.al. (1998). Laying out the assumptions and the derivations allow the logic of 
the argument to be critiqued; the suitability of the assumptions and the ability to validate 
stylized facts ensure the analysis is relevant.  
 
The suggested exchange rate regime contributes to stimulating the real sector through 
encouraging trade, ensuring external balance over the long-run, maintaining stability in 
the forex market, and contributing to the control of inflation by countering supply shocks. 
Limited variability is consistent with maintaining a competitive real effective exchange 
rate to  encourage  exports, and can also be used to moderate supply side inflationary 
shocks. The latter function helps the Central Bank maintain low inflation and further 
increases its ability to adapt interest rates to the domestic cycle and achieve vital political 
goals.  
 
The models allow us to explore the tradeoff between interest and exchange rate volatility 
in  the  intermediate  regimes  found  in  most  EMEs  today.  In  a  regime  of  large  capital 
inflows, accumulation of reserves and aggressive sterilization can prevent appreciation, 
but interest rates rise. Such a restrictive macroeconomic policy response may harm the 
real sector and lead to the reversal it fears. But over appreciation of the exchange rate can 
harm  trade,  and  intervention  without  full  sterilization  can  cause  a  damaging  over-
expansion of the money supply, which again raises interest rates because of expected 
inflation. Monetary policy has to find a fine balance.  Currency risk, which we focus on, 
can aggravate systemic, liquidity and credit risk in thin EME financial markets. Global 
and regional measures are also required to reduce these risks, but in this paper we focus 
on a feasible country initiative. 
 
Macrovolatilities reported in Section 2 lay out Indian stylized facts the analysis aims to 
reproduce  and  brings  out  the  importance  of  the  exchange  rate.  Section  3  gives  an 
overview of reform in Indian exchange rates and forex market microstructure. Section 4 
describes  relevant  aspects  of  institutional  structure.  Section  5  presents  the  model,   4 
theoretical results and empirical validation through regressions and simulations. Section 6 
applies it to explain policy choices and outcome. Section 7 concludes.      
 
2. Shocks and volatilities 
In order to identify potential causes of the Indian growth slowdown over 1997-02, and 
the recovery that followed, the pattern of macroeconomic volatility is examined across 
four pre- and post reform, high and low growth periods
3.  
 
Since  India  continues  to  be  a  monsoon  and  imported  oil  dependent  economy,  it  is 
relevant to ask if the typical shocks were active. Agriculture’s average rate of growth did 
fall and volatility was higher over the low growth period, 1997-2003. And inflation in 
fuel products was higher in the nineties, and its volatility was higher in the low growth 
periods.   
 
But reform offered new opportunities to smooth the traditional shocks, particularly as the 
severe  foreign  exchange  constraint  was  removed.  Moreover,  fluctuations  in  foreign 
inflows and exchange rates can themselves be a source of shock. Policy can contribute 
towards smoothing these shocks or, if poorly designed, can magnify the shocks. Post 
reform foreign financial inflows, measured by the surplus on the capital account rose, but 
their volatility fell. The volatility of the current account deficit (CAD), however, rose, 
suggesting that policy was magnifying the effect of the inflows. The CAD measures the 
actual absorption of foreign savings in domestic investment. Although their trend was 
stable, short-term fluctuations of foreign portfolio inflows did impact exchange rates.   
 
The volatility of exchange and nominal interest rates rose post-reform while that of real 
interest rates fell, in line with the philosophy of reducing administrative rigidities and 
allowing  markets  to  discover  equilibrium  values.  Lending  interest  rates  fell  less  than 
interest rates on government securities and deposit rates. All nominal interest rates fell 
substantially, although all real interest rates did not, the exchange rate appreciated and its 
volatility rose, in the recovery phase of 2002-04.  
                                                            
3 The detailed means, volatilities and correlations are available in a project report (Goyal, 2005).   5 
 
The impact of interest rates rose significantly in the post-reform period. The correlation 
of private investment with lagged nominal interest rates became high and negative while 
it was positive with real interest rates. Nominal rates were fixed pre-reform therefore 
could not have much impact. Nominal interest rates turn out to be positively correlated 
with both currency depreciation and inflation. 
 
Since the economy was steadily and in some periods explosively accumulating reserves
4 
post reform and there was active sterilization, the rate of growth of reserve money was 
lower, but broad money was unchanged and its volatility fell indicating more efficient 
financial intermediation. The rate of growth of money supply and credit/GDP ratio is low 
compared to world averages. 
 
Volatility of output and consumption growth in India is low compared to other 
developing countries and has not changed much across the period. Therefore the focus 
has to be on investment fluctuations to understand variations in growth. Fluctuations in 
total investment rose while public investment fell steadily. 
 
Government deficits tended to fall in the high growth post reform period and rise in the 
low growth period. There have been attempts to restrain the Central Deficit, but States’ 
deficits  rose.  But  there  was  no  excess  demand  despite  a  fiscal  deficit,  and  a  current 
account surplus appeared in the balance of payments.  
 
Fluctuations in investment were linked to exchange and interest rate volatility, which are 
subject  to  policy  influence.  Indian  exchange  rates  showed  bursts  of  high  volatility 
following  periods  when  the  nominal  exchange  rate  was  almost  static.  Interest  rate 
volatility exceeded exchange rate volatility for much of the nineties. This was contrary to 
most EMEs, which, after the Asian crisis moved to middle exchange rate regimes; their 
                                                            
4 Forex reserves rose to 120 billion US dollars in 2004, compared to a paltry 5 billion in 1990-91. 30 billion 
dollars were accumulated in just 18 months over January 2002 to August 2003. Arbitrage occurred at the 
short end since Indian short real rates were kept higher than US rates.   6 
interest volatility has been falling and is lower than exchange rate volatility, although the 
latter is also bounded.  
 
3. Reforms in the Exchange Rate and Market Microstructure 
Although in the short-term market perceptions and policy can affect the exchange rate, in 
the longer-term it cannot depart from equilibrium rates determined by macroeconomic 
fundamentals including relative productivity.  
 
In India a benchmark real effective exchange rate (REER) was set after the devaluations 
of the early nineties, in order to maintain a competitive real exchange rate and encourage 
exports. The REER, which gives weights according to major trading partners and corrects 
for relative inflation, was not allowed to appreciate. This is a valid strategy as long as 
India,  like  China,  has  large  reserves  of  labor  that  need  to  be  absorbed  into  higher 
productivity  employment  to  which  exports  can  contribute.  An  economy  at  full 
employment requires an appreciation of the exchange rate to absorb foreign inflows since 
a rise in domestic absorption occurs through a rise in imports. But in an economy with 
excess capacity the rise in absorption can occur at unchanged real exchange rate, through 
output and capacity expansion. 
 
The  nominal  effective  exchange  rate  (NEER)  continued  to  depreciate,  since  Indian 
inflation rates were higher than those of trading partners. There was some appreciation in 
both  REER  and  NEER  from  2003.  But  it  was  not  large  enough  to  imply  a  major 
appreciation  over  the  lowest  value  reached  1992-93
5.  Some  appreciation  could  occur 
without  making  exports  costlier  because  of  productivity  improvements  and  a  fall  in 
inflation.    Export  growth  was  impressive  despite  the  appreciation.    Both  the  global 
recovery and productivity improvements helped exporters beat the depreciating dollar, 
suggesting that limited nominal appreciation may be feasible without harming exports.   
 
                                                            
5 Different indices range from 10 percent depreciation to a 28 percent appreciation.    7 
But the nominal exchange rate showed bursts of high volatility
6 following periods when 
it was almost static. Such reversals cause over-reaction by market players as well as 
policy makers. Indian interest rate volatility has exceeded exchange rate volatility for 
much of the nineties.  Policy makers have traditionally regarded traders in Indian markets 
as prone to destabilizing speculative behavior, but as in other areas, poor market design 
and price structure induced such behavior
7. A trend one-way movement in a currency 
induces one-way bets.  
 
Thus exchange rate policy, in its own way, distorted incentives. Usually either importers 
or exporters covered their currency exposure; with two-way movement both would have 
an incentive to do so. During the period of steady depreciation only importers used to buy 
forward  cover.  Over  2003  as  the  rupee  appreciated  only  exporters  were  hedging. 
Importers also rushed for cover
8 when the rupee started depreciating in May 2004. Thin 
markets raise the cost of formal hedging, and a high interest differential raises the cost of 
informal hedging. If an importer holds a dollar deposit as an informal hedge he sacrifices 
domestic high interest. If he has to borrow in rupees he pays an additional much higher 
interest  at  home.  Similar  considerations  affect  banks  acting  on  behalf  of  retail  trade. 
Banks will not hedge, but unless open exposure is strictly limited banks would arbitrage: 
take dollar deposits and make high interest domestic loans. If zero or low exposure is 
enforced, banks contribution to the forex market and to discovering the value of the rupee 
is limited. The CB is forced to intervene to set the exchange rate.  
 
Although there are still some restrictions on hedging indirect currency risk, the reverse of 
the trend depreciation in 2002-03 led to a 51 per cent rise of activity in rupee derivatives. 
                                                            
6 These results and also variations in the REER and NEER are available in Goyal (2004). 
7 This has often caused great trauma to traders and to certain communities that specialize in trade. See 
Hardgrove (2004) for a study of the Indian Marwari community and their self-understanding and sense of 
identity. They were said to be gamblers but for example, the traditional gambling on the rains actually 
served to hedge against income loss. Political rhetoric equated foodgrain traders to the rats who eat grains 
and deserve to be shot. 
8 There were reports that Infosys and Wipro would not be able to gain from the depreciation because of the 
forward cover they had taken. The point is precisely that with hedging they can stop worrying about the 
impact of the rupee on their profits, and trying to make money from rupee movements. Instead they can 
concentrate on what they are good at—producing better and more productive software.  
   8 
It continued, however, to be concentrated in few players, mostly foreign banks. But new 
technology  and  regulatory  market  design  is  enhancing  market  activity  yet  lowering 
destabilizing speculation. Electronic market making is being applied to forex markets and 
has reduced turnover.  
 
Limited exchange rate volatility is easier to hedge than interest rate volatility, which has a 
deeper impact particularly when bank loans are the dominant mode of finance. Since the 
reliance on bank debt is high in an EME sharp interest rate volatility delivers a severe 
shock to the financial system. Other policies such as transparency, prudential regulation, 
and liquidity enhancement are required for a healthy financial system. But since limited 
ability  to  borrow  in  one’s  own  currency  is  a  major  source  of  financial  instability, 
lowering currency risk will reduce financial instability.  
 
Another reason for instability and crises in currency markets is the tendency of traders to 
over-react. In times of trouble, market participants are thinking not about what the correct 
value of the exchange rate is; but about guessing correctly what other people think it is. 
Uncertainty about what a small section is going to do can lead to cumulative movements.   
In  situations  where  fundamentals  are  not  strong,  or  some  shocks  have  occurred,  and 




4. Institutional structure 
In an EME concerned to maintain a competitive exchange rate in order to encourage 
exports, rapid capital inflows imply a rapid accumulation of reserves in order to prevent a 
nominal  appreciation.  But  because  inflation  is  a  highly  political  issue  when  wage 
indexation is very limited, there is a high degree of sterilization. In the simple Mundell-
Fleming  (M-F)  model  this  implies  rising  interest  rates  and  further  inflows.  Monetary 
                                                            
9 An example from Indian markets was the “Manic Monday” on May 17
th, 2004, due to unexpected election 
results. Stock markets crashed and had to be shut down. The RBI made a public announcement on its 
website that it was ready to sell forex and to provide liquidity as required. The availability of the window 
meant it was not required. Since each player knew that the other knew that liquidity was available there was 
no need for a panic rush to be the first to draw a limited stock.   9 
policy looses its independence being tied to maintaining the fixed exchange rate. The 
cycle can end in a crisis with a reversal of inflows and a collapse of the exchange rate. 
But  there  are  degrees  of  freedom  for  monetary  policy  from  the  many  ways  such  a 
developing country’s structure differs from the prototype M-F model. These differences 
include  limits  on  capital  account  convertibility,  specific  wage-price  rigidities  and 
dualistic labor markets.  
 
The large informal labor market, accounts for 94 percent of the work force. There is no 
cost  of  living  indexation  so  that  nominal  wage  adjustment  is  lagged,  but  there  are 
political pressures to keep real wages fixed in terms of food; and pressures from a well 
organized farm lobby (more than 50 percent of the population) for high and rising farm 
support prices. The compromise has been to subsidize farmers and consumers, the latter 
through  a  low  price  public  distribution  system.  Since  the  protection  is  not  complete, 
nominal wages rise with a lag in response to a rise in food prices leading to inflation. 
 
In a more open economy, the effect of border prices on food prices, allows an escape 
from this inflation cum subsidy trap. The larger trade in agricultural commodities, added 
to  oil  imports,  gives  the  exchange  rate  a  greater  impact  on  the  inflationary  process. 
Therefore exchange rate policy can help moderate the effect of the typical EME supply 
shocks: oil price shocks and failure of rains. Svensson (2000) points out that the lag from 
the  exchange  rate  to  consumer  prices  is  the  shortest.  If  two-way  movement  of  the 
nominal exchange rate is synchronized with temporary supply shocks, and the exchange 
rate  appreciates  when  there  is  a  negative  supply  shock,  it  would  lower  the  prices  of 
intermediate and food prices. The competitive pressure would abate political pressures to 
raise  farm  support  prices,  and  then  to  subsidize  consumers  or  otherwise  intervene  to 
repress  inflation  resulting  from  rising  nominal  wages.  This  differs  from  fixing  the 
exchange  rate  to  bring  down  high  levels  of  inflation,  which  normally  led  to  real 
appreciation  and  ended  in  a  crisis  in  the  countries  where  such  exchange-based 
stabilization  was  tried.  Two-way  movement  only  pre-empts  the  effect  of  temporary 
supply shocks on the domestic price-wage process. 
    10 
Since keeping inflation low and real wages constant in terms of a basic consumption 
basket are political imperatives, an exchange rate policy that furthers these objectives is 
politically feasible. If it reduces the necessity for subsidies and administered prices that 
distort incentives and lower efficiency, it would lower waste in the system.  
 
A  dualistic  labor  market  structure  implies  that  if  food  prices  are  stable,  capital  is 
available, specific bottlenecks are alleviated and institutional reforms undertaken; supply 
will not be a constraint on output, which is below potential. If flexible inflation targeting, 
with  some  help  from  the  exchange  rate,  anchors  nominal  wages  and  inflationary 
expectations, a rise in credit can finance an expansion in output, capital and capacity. 
Since the foreign exchange constraint is relieved, so are constraints on imports of food 
stocks,  fuel  oils  and  capital  goods
10.  Moreover  new  technology  makes  it  possible  to 
bypass deficiencies in infrastructure. Reduction in bureaucratic rationing and continuing 
reforms shorten lags and delays, making supply more elastic. 
 
There is evidence that fluctuating exchange rates do not have a large effect on trade; it is 
currency crises that adversely affect trade (McKenzie 2004). If limited volatility helps 
prevent crises and lower interest rates, it would actually benefit trade.  
 
CBs have a problem in that they have more targets—output, inflation, exchange and 
interest rates, than instruments. We demonstrate in the section below that with policy that 
suits EME structure and typical shocks discussed above, markets may help CBs achieve 
their objectives
11, while overreaction is moderated, and the risk premium lowered. 
 
 5 The Model 
We build in the dualistic labor market, the structure of shocks identified in the stylized 
facts, and a simple forex market in a standard open economy IS-LM-UIP (uncovered 
                                                            
10 It may even relieve India’s pressing infrastructure needs. The Indian Government decided in 2004 to 
issue bonds against the reserves in order to fund spending on infrastructure, motivated by the Chinese 
Government’s successful large spending in this area, and the inability of the private sector to deliver despite 
inducements. There is a focus on public private partnerships. 
11 Ito and Park (2004) find an intermediate regime, such as a basket band regime, to be compatible with 
other monetary policy goals, such as inflation targeting, under a variety of shocks.   11 
interest  parity)  model,  in  order  to  examine  if  macroeconomic  policy  can  implement 
counter-cyclical interest rates that strengthens fundamentals and moderate shocks. 
 
5.1. A Macro Structural Model of a Small Open Economy 
The building blocks of the model are first, an aggregate demand equation where output, 
yt, responds positively to the real exchange rate and negatively to the real interest rate. 
( ) ( ) ( ) t
e
t t t t t t p p i p p e y - - - - + = +1
* s d         (1) 
The nominal exchange  rate et is measured in units of foreign currency so that a rise 
implies a depreciation of the home currency. Since pt denotes home country prices and 
*
t p  foreign prices, the term in the first bracket gives the real exchange rate. Expected 
inflation  ( ) t
e
t p p - +1  subtracted from the nominal interest rate gives the real interest rate 
in the second bracket. All variables are expressed as log-linearized deviations from a 
mean.  
 
Money market equilibrium gives: 
t t t t t v i y p m - - = - f a             (2) 
Since we assume the money supply is used to target interest rates, vt is the composite 
demand shock plus money supply response. A rise in vt will reduce it. 
 
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) arising from arbitrage implies that expected depreciation 
of the exchange rate plus the risk premium ￿t, must equal the interest differential: 
t t
e
t t e e i r + - = +1               (3) 
Next we turn to the supply side: 
  ( ) 1 1 1 1 + + + + + - + - = - t t t t t t t g y w w p p h y                 (4) 
Producer prices are marked up on wages. Therefore producer price inflation responds to 
nominal  wage  inflation,  lagged  output  (through  pro-cyclical  mark-ups)  and 
contemporaneous  oil  (ht+1)  or  productivity  (gt+1)  shocks  to  supply.  Nominal  wages 
respond to lagged inflation in the consumer price index,
c
t p , which is a weighted average   12 
of home and foreign prices. Therefore wt =
c
t p 1 - . Since 
*
t p  is normalized to zero, 
c
t p  
responds directly to et: 
  ( ) t t
c
t e p p l l - + = 1               (5) 
Substituting out wages from equation (4) and assuming that productivity is not changing 
gives:  




t t t y p p p p h y                                                          (6) 
With trade liberalization food prices become more closely linked to border prices and the 
weight of et in equation (5) rises; 
c
t p  responds to et; wages respond to
c
t p ; and producer 
prices are marked up on wages. If w does not rise, neither will pt+1, unless there is an 
adverse supply shock ht+1. 
 
The dualistic labor market structure with large numbers willing to work at a low constant 
real  consumption  wage  implies  constant  returns  to  scale  to  capital
12.  The  real 
consumption wage is around subsistence so firms do not gain from lowering it, since 
productivity falls commensurately. The availability of labor implies that, over a horizon 
exceeding one year, which is long enough for the capital stock to rise, mean output  y  
would lie below potential output y .  
 
In the short run we consider in the model, if food prices are constant labor cost does not 
rise, if there is no cost shock intermediate inputs prices also do not rise, and if mark-ups 
are  constant,  deviations  from  mean  output  are  demand  determined  at  constant  cost. 
Subsistence commodities, especially food, have a high weight in the consumption basket 
and therefore in
c
t P . If dualism and rigidities lower the response to price variables in an 
                                                            
12 It is easy to show this in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function 
b b - =
1 L AK Y  where Y is the 
output level, K the capital stock, L labor employed. Normalizing the constant consumption wage 
1 =
c
t P W , where W is the nominal wage and capital P indicates the price level, equating this to the 
marginal product of labor gives a value for L, which when substituted in the production function gives 
( ) ( )
( ) K K A B A Y t
b b = - =
- 1 1  or the standard AK production function with CRS.   13 
EME, price elasticities such as d, s may be low, but rising with reform
13. To the extent 
money demand becomes more unstable with development, money supply has to respond 
more frequently in order to prevent large fluctuations in interest rates, but the equilibrium 
condition  (2)  must  continue  to  hold.  Since  money  supply  mt  is  itself  not  the  policy 
instrument, it can be taken to be zero. Constant mark-ups and CRS imply that 0 ~ y , and 
the large weight of food in 
c
t P  implies that l is also low. Therefore, the exchange rate 
plays a major role in price determination. If it responds inversely to a terms of trade shock 
or rise in
*
t P , 
c
t P  and therefore W will not rise.  
 
Reforms allow faster labor absorption and an upward trend in the mean output y . Capital 
accumulation  and  organizational  change  over  time  will  raise  labor  productivity,  and 
increasing competition through opening out will reduce mark-ups. These factors will tend 
to further reduce inflation until the economy reaches a mature steady state. We abstract 
from them in order to simplify the analysis, but these factors would support the policy 
combination we explore below. The effect of money supply on prices comes in through 
the money market equation (2). An excessive rise in money supply is inflationary, if 
short-run capacity constraints are reached; but not if cost shocks have the dominant effect 
on prices in the short-run. 
 
Simplifying  assumptions,  common  in  the  literature,  further  adapt  the  model  to  the 
structure of the EME, its typical shocks, and the focus on the response of monetary policy 
to shocks. If the limited volatility of the real exchange rate does not have a major impact 
on trade, we can assume d = 0 and the first term or the real exchange rate drops out of 
equation (1). Hedging reduces internal shocks to the risk premium and we abstract from 
external  shocks.  In  the  analytical  derivation  we  restrict  the  horizon  to  2  periods.  All 
agents including the CB have a two period horizon. No trade occurs in the forex market 
                                                            
13 Ghosh (2002) estimates d =0.114, s = 0.152, a = 0.225 and f = 1.420, for the US and OECD countries. 
Cavoli and Rajan (2004) estimate d =- 0.09, s = 0.36 for Thailand. Thus trade effects are small and of the 
wrong sign, and interest elasticity is large. Estimates of aggregate demand and supply functions for India, 
with monthly and quarterly data for the period after 1995, show d to be insignificant, while s is large and 
significant. Aggregate supply shows negative effects of excess capacity and positive impact of external 
prices on WPI inflation (see the Appendix).    14 
in period 2 since the exchange rate has stabilized. Since predetermined variables are set 
to zero, 0 1 = = p p
c
o . All exogenous foreign price variables are also taken to be zero. In 
accordance with our stylized facts, we consider the case of the period 1 monetary policy 
variable v1 responding to an expected supply shock in period 2, h2. As a result it is 
possible to set v2 = 0 and h1 = 0.  
 
The CB has prior knowledge of the supply shock from its close following of trends and 
understanding of economic structure. In period 1 it learns that an adverse supply shock 
will impact the economy in period 2. It responds by lowering interest rates (raising v1) in 
period 1. It is fully transparent and announces both the expected shock and its action. 
 
Agents anticipate future prices and exchange rates and understand the CB’s objective 
function. Expectations are model consistent and are realized in equilibrium. Therefore 
equilibrium values can be derived by the method of backward induction, starting with 
period 2 variables. 
 
Under the assumptions made which give 
c p p e i 1 2 2 2 , = - =  and using equations (1) to (5) 
we can solve for y2 and e2 as functions of p2 the inherited producer price: 
( )


















y           (8) 
Reverting to period 1, the aggregate demand function reduces to: 
[ ]
e p i y 2 1 1 - - = s           (9) 
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Price dynamics from the Phillips curve give: 
( ) 2 1 1 2 1 h y l + + - = y e p                                                 (12) 
Remembering p1 = 0, since  0 ~ l  and  0 ~ y  equation (12) simplifies further. Substituting 
for e1 and y1 and imposing the condition that  2 2 e e
e =  and  2 2 p p
e =  so that expectations 
are realized gives: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) as f as f f
as h as f f as
+ + + +
+ - + +
=
2 1 1
2 1 1 1 2
2
v
p       (13) 
Substituting (13) in the equations for e1 and y1 allows us to solve for these variables as 
functions of the exogenous parameters and shocks. We drop r from the UIP equation 
since the risk premium is assumed not to change. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) as
s
as f as f
as h as f as s
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+
+ + + +
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since the second v1 term dominates in equation (14). 
 










































The response of p2, e2 and y2 to the shocks can be readily derived from equations (13), (7) 
and (8). The signs are collected in Table 1. 
 
The results imply that an anticipatory policy response (v1) to a supply shock h2 that tends 
to reduce interest rates can raise y1, moderate or reverse the fall in y2 and neutralize the   16 
effect  of  the  supply  shock  on  inflation.  Moreover,  such  a  policy  package  would 
appreciate the exchange rate in period one with some reversion to the mean in the second 
period. The appreciation in the exchange rate is what counters the effect of the supply 
shock on inflation. The anticipated rise in p2 together with the fall in i1 lowers the real 
interest rate and stimulates y1, but this rise is moderated by the anticipated appreciation. 
 
Table 1: Response of variables to shocks 
         Variables 
Shocks 
P2  e1  y1  e2  y2  i1  i2 
v1  -  -  +  +  +  -  - 
h2  +  -  +  -  -  +  + 
 
It is possible to extend the results to explore how outcomes are affected if the CB does 
not fully share its prior information on h2 with the public in period 1. Then period 2 
inflation  may  not  be  fully  expected.  But  sharing  information  will  benefit  the  CB  if 
expected period 2 inflation lowers the real interest rate and stimulates output. Expected 
inflation rises because of lags in the adjustment of producer prices. CB cannot gain from 
reducing expected appreciation even if it lowers expected inflation, if as we see below, 
forex market expectations help it to achieve the required appreciation.  
 
The CB does not have an incentive to create an inflation bias because in the labor market 
structure postulated, a surprise fall in real wages lowers labor productivity and therefore 
does not lead to a rise in labor demand and output. Moreover, in a low per capita income 
EME, inflation is a sensitive political issue. So the CB is strongly motivated to keep 
inflation low. All this implies that the full information equilibrium is sub game perfect, 
optimal and credible, with the private sectors’ expectations of price rise fully realized. 
 
When  the  supply  curve  is  elastic  but  inflation  rises  due  to  a  temporary  cost  shock, 
reducing demand will only reduce output and not inflation. Appreciation will shift down 
the supply curve reducing inflation, and the rise in demand will raise output. Thus there is 
no output cost of this strategy of inflation reduction for the combination of shocks v1 and 
h2. By reducing reliance on monetary tightening and administrative distortions to reduce 
inflation, output can actually rise.    17 
 
Given the surplus labor and high productivity of capital, lowering real interest rates raises 
demand  and  also  encourages  capital  formation,  which  raises  mean  output  levels. 
Lowering nominal interest rates can also encourage investment because of the effect on 
the net worth of firms (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003). One of the aims of reform is to 
bring down the large gap that exists between domestic and world interest rates. This gap 
is partly due to differential inflation, to administrative rigidities, higher risk premium and 
expected depreciation. Reducing the interest gap not only stimulates output, but also, 
over time may help to reduce these other distortions. The interest gap can be further 
factored  as * i i i i - + - ,  with  average  domestic  interest  rates  exceeding  international. 
Exchange rate policy can contribute to shrinking the latter gap. At maturity i would be 
tied down by world inflation and real interest rate.  
 
The deviation of output below potential (or the interest differential which influences it) 
and inflation both reduce the CB’s utility, U. The weight w, on the loss due to inflation in 
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Inserting  equilibrium  values  of  the  variables  in  the  CB’s  objective  function  and 
differentiating with reference to v1, gives the optimal value of the policy variable v1.  
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v*1 rises with h2 and with the interest elasticity of money demand, f, and falls with w the 
weight on inflation in the CB’s loss function
14.  
 
Remembering that i2 = -e2, it is easy to see that: 
                                                            
14 Substituting h
e
2=q h2 in the CB’s loss function, where q is the information disclosure, differentiating 
with respect to q gives the solution for q* or the optimal degree of information disclosure, although we are 
abstracting from this by assuming full information disclosure. q* falls with h2 and rises with vI .   18 





















A rise in v1 upto v*1  lowers the CB’s loss, or increase its welfare. 
 
5.2. Empirical Results 
Estimates of Aggregate Demand and Supply are reported in the Appendix. Parsimonious 
specifications as close as possible to the theoretical specifications are estimated with both 
monthly and quarterly data. Given this the R-squared, F and t statistics are good. 
Moreover, results are similar for both data sets. They validate the assumptions made in 
the theoretical section.  Interest rate elasticity is high and the real depreciation variable is 
not significant. Since India’s prices and interest rates are still administered to some extent 
the real long rate has a positive coefficient, while that on inflation is negative. This 
suggests that inflation is largely due to cost push factors and has a negative effect on 
demand. Since long nominal rates do not adjust rapidly, real interest rates are low when 
inflation is high and demand is low, explaining the positive coefficient on real rates. 
 
The aggregate supply curve shows the effect of lagged consumer prices on wholesale 
price inflation, with some evidence of mean reversion in the quarter. Nominal exchange 
Rates are not significant but may be affecting through the CPI, and other external prices 
have a direct impact. Potential output tends to decrease prices. 
  
Simulations allow us to get results with the full optimization model
15, without imposing 
any zero restrictions. They also allow us to move away from the assumption of only 2 
periods. The results are similar to those from the analytical derivations documented in 
Table 1, and sensitivity analysis makes it possible to calibrate to benchmark parameter 
values, which turn out to be close to estimated values for Asian EMEs (see footnote 11). 
The simulations are run for 12 periods with equal unit weights put on the variables in the 
loss function which are taken as p and y. Nine of the simulations are reported in Charts 1 
and 2 (g1 to g9). Each row in the charts reports the effect on p, p
c, y, e and v respectively 
                                                            
15 The simulations modified a GAUSS code for solving for optimal monetary policy under discretion, made 
available by Paul Soderlind on his website http://home.tiscalinet.ch/paulsoderlind. I 
thank Ramkishen Rajan and Tony Cavoli for suggesting this code.    19 
of a period one shock of size 0.1
2. Since the variables are measured in log deviations 
from steady state values, a shock leads to a diversion from zero with adjustment back 
towards equilibrium over time. In Chart 1 the range of variation on the y axis is –0.2 to 
0.2, and in Chart 2 –0.1to 0.1. For the first eight simulations, the shock is a cost shock h1, 
and for the last simulation, it is a positive demand shock to y. 
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Chart 1: Impulse responses (g1 to g4)  
Each row reports the effect on p, p
c, y, e and v respectively of a period one cost shock of size 0.1
2. In Row 
1 the parameter values are ￿ = 1; s = 0.6; f = 0.6; l = 0.5; ￿ = 0; d = 0. In Row 2 the changes are ￿ = 0.1; d 
= 0.1. Row 3 changes d to 0.3, with other parameters as in Row 2. Row 4 has ￿ = 0.2; d = 0.1. 
 
 
Benchmark values resulting from the sensitivity analysis are ￿ = 1; s = 0.4; f = 0.6; l = 
0.5; ￿ = 0.1; ￿ = 0.1; d = 0.1; and the variance of the period 1 shock is taken to be 0.1
2. 
The parameter ￿ picks up the effect of lagged log output on the log of producer prices p 
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Chart 2: Impulse responses contd. (g5 to g9)  
Each row reports the effect on p, p
c, y, e and v respectively of a period one cost shock of variance 0.1
2. In 
the last row the shock is a positive demand shock to output. Row 1 is the benchmark for all the simulations 
in this figure. The parameter values are ￿ = 1; s = 0.4; f = 0.6; l = 0.5; ￿ = 0.1; d = 0.1. The change here is 
the fall in s.  In Row 2, f is reduced to 0.4. In Row 3, f is increased to 0.7. Row 3 changes d to 0.3, with 
other parameters as in Row 2. Row 4 has d = 0.2. Row 5 has a positive shock to output of variance 0.1
2, no 
cost shock, and other parameters as in Row 1. 
 
Chart 1, Row 1, ￿ and d are 0 as in the analytical derivations. The basic pattern of a price 
shock leading to a rise in v, appreciation, fall in p
c, rise in y and p is established. After the 
initial jump away from zero, and some adjustments in the early periods there is not much 
change over the course of the 12 period simulations.  
   21 
In Row 2, positive coefficients for ￿ and d moderate the rise in v and resulting 
appreciation. The rise in y and fall in p
c is less, and p rises more in the first few periods 
and then less. For all variables there is more change during the period of the simulation. 
But the basic pattern remains intact in the more general model. 
  
The results are sensitive to the elasticity of export demand. In Row 3, as d is raised to 0.2, 
the pattern changes. There is a fall in v, a smaller appreciation, fall in y, rise in both p and 
p
c in response to a cost shock. But estimation rarely finds d to exceed 0.1, and for d = 0.1 
the basic pattern continues to hold. 
 
A higher effect of y on p, or a rise in ￿ and ￿ to 0.2 in Row 4, leads to a smaller rise in v, 
a smaller appreciation, a small fall in y, p
c now remains positive through out, while p is 
first higher and then lower compared to the benchmark. 
 
In Chart 2, Row 1, a fall in the interest elasticity of aggregate demand s by 0.2 to 0.4 
makes v rise slightly less initially and then slightly more, with appreciation echoing this 
pattern. The rise in y is less; p
c is less negative, and p higher. Since the value of 0.4 is 
closer to empirical estimations we take this as our benchmark, the basic pattern of 
response to a cost shock continues to be the same. 
 
The results are not sensitive to changes in the parameters of the money demand function, 
since v adjusts fully to compensate. Row 2 and 3 show the results of a change in the 
interest elasticity of money demand,f, first to 0.4 and then to 0.7. If f is lower v has to 
rise more to be equally effective. 
 
A simulation with no cost shock and a positive demand shock to output of standard 
deviation 0.1, leads to a fall in money supply leading to a fall in output after the period 1 
rise, the exchange rate now depreciates, p
c is positive, and p negative. The pattern of 
response of variables is now different. Since the variables are all log deviations from 
steady-state levels, money supply is contracted to bring output back towards its steady-
state value.   22 
 
Therefore we can safely conclude a rise in money supply, after a supply shock, minimizes 
the CB’s loss function. It leads to an appreciation, which lowers prices, while output 
rises. 
 
We examine how the forex market can contribute to this policy package in the section 
below. 
 
5.3. The Forex Market 
Fluctuations in the exchange rate occur as a consequence of arbitrage across interest rates 
by forex traders who buy or sell the home currency. Forex markets have a combination of 
informed traders who know the fundamentals, and noise traders who make systematic 
errors  and  try  to  derive  information  by  observing  market  price  and  the  activity  of 
informed traders. The forex market differs from other markets because the CB is the 
largest trader and normally has more information than any other player. 
 
In our simple illustration the CB is fully transparent so that we can restrict our analysis to 
informed traders – we assume all traders are fully informed. Summing over i traders 
gives the total market demand D(et) in period t. 
( ) ( ) ￿ =
1
0 , di i e D e D t t           (16) 
Markets must clear in equilibrium so that demand equals supply: 
( ) ( ) t t e D e S =             (17) 
In our example we assume the CB does not need to intervene, therefore some traders who 
need to unwind their positions must be selling for others to buy. A trader’s utility is a 
negative exponential of wealth W, with q as the constant coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion. Their wealth is derived from trading profit and is normally distributed: 
( ) ( ) W W u q - - = exp           (18) 
This implies that their preferences or the objective function, which they maximize, can be 
represented as a simple function of the mean and variance of trading profit.   23 
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      (19) 
The demand function obtained from maximizing (19) is: 














Or demand rises with the mean or expected appreciation and falls with the variance of the 
exchange rate. It is lower if q is high. Expectations will be mean reverting if policy is 
strengthening fundamentals. If the CB is able to use exchange rate expectations and the 
forex market to limit exchange rate variance within bounds, but at the same time, ensure 
some  variance  within  those  bounds,  it  will  be  able  to  target  the  interest  rate  to  the 
domestic cycle and counter supply shocks such as h. 
In our simple model the CB does not need to intervene in forex markets at all. Operating 
one instrument v achieves desired movements in i, e, y and p.  Intervention or signaling 
may be required if the variance of e exceeds the bounds set. In thin markets and with high 
reserves,  CB  intervention  can  be  highly  effective.  Even  allowing  for  traders  without 
knowledge of fundamentals, the bounded variance will lower returns to and attract fewer 
such noise traders (Jeanne and Rose, 2002). The stimulus for hedging will also reduce 
trader entry into forex markets and panic one-way movements. Deepening forex markets 
will facilitate an eventual move to a floating exchange rate. 
5.4. Outcomes 
In the above model (Section 5.3) since traders expect to profit from the appreciation in 
period 1 net demand for the home currency will rise and cause the expected appreciation; 
net sales in the next period will cause it to revert to mean. This reversion and the bounds 
the CB sets on the exchange rate limit the variance. The reversion prevents extended 
explosive one-way movements.  
Consider the CB’s optimal policy v*1 in response to a supply shock h2. From (19) the 
trader’s optimal response to this policy is net buying (B). Since both the CB and forex   24 
traders are maximizing their objective functions, payoffs are highest in the strategy (v*1, 
B) shown as (10,10) in Figure 1. It is the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. 
Figure 1 also shows the payoffs to all other strategy combinations. If traders sell when the 
CB plays v*1 they have negative returns as the currency appreciates. The CB also incurs 
some cost from successful intervention so the payoffs to (v*1, S) are (7, -3). The other 
strategies available to the CB are to respond to h2 by increasing v1 above v*1 to vH or 
decreasing it below v*1 to vL. In each case forex traders decide whether to turn net buyers 
(B) or sellers (S) of the currency. From Table 10 if v1 is decreased, output will fall, the 
interest rate will rise, and the exchange rate will depreciate. The CB’s payoffs will fall, 
and dealers will gain more from a sell strategy compared to a buy strategy. This explains 




















However, over expansion of the money supply is possible if v1 is increased too much. 
This becomes more likely if output is near full capacity, there is a large revenue deficit 
already boosting demand, the interest elasticities s, f are low, and the response of prices 
to  output  y  is  high.  An  attempt  to  lower  interest  rates  would  then  raise  inflationary 
expectations  and  result  in  an  uncontrollable  exchange  rate  depreciation,  which  may 
breach  the  variance  bound  making  a  defensive  rise  in  interest  rates  necessary.  The 
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Figure 1: Payoffs to the CB and forex traders (F) under 
alternative strategy combinations   25 
 
The structure of payoffs explains why the central policy combination 2 of Figure 1 is 
most often found in practice. Conservative CBs may prefer the median low risk payoffs, 
when parameter values are at the margin, uncertainties are high, or there is fiscal fragility. 
If  the  EME  is  a  democracy  with  low  per  capita  income,  even  if  the  CB  is  not 
independent,  the  government  will  impose  conservative  inflation  preferences.  Or  the 
Government may alternate between 1 and 3 or 1 and 2. Some uncertainty in payoffs can 
explain use of mixed strategies as in Harsanyi (1973). Small variations in each player’s 
payoffs, known only to that player himself, determine the probability other players give 
to his adopting a particular strategy. 
 
Since the game brings out the effect of individual decisions and strategic interactions it 
can be used  as a benchmark to understand actual policy choices.  It demonstrates the 
sensitivity of outcomes to monetary policy—excess volatility results from non-optimal 
policy. But in applying it to the real world, political and psychological factors have to be 
taken into account. 
 
6. Events, feasibility and politics 
The analysis above, applied to explain actual policy choices and outcomes, yields an 
analytical narrative
16. Rational choice theory from the analysis is section 5 gives a deeper 
understanding of Indian post-reform macroeconomic episodes by highlighting the actors, 
their decision points, choices and outcomes that followed.  
Why were optimal choices not made? What were the perceptions of the agents involved 
in making crucial decisions, what was their view of the constraints they faced, and the 
strategies that would benefit them? How have these changed over the years? 
In the post-reform period, the severe credit squeeze and rise in interest rates that followed 
the first episode of exchange rate volatility in 1995-96 helped trigger off a sustained 
                                                            
16 Bates et.al. (1998) develop a methodology of analytical narratives and apply it to case studies.   26 
industrial slowdown
17. In our model, low interest elasticities imply v*1 is low, if there is a 
perception that interest elasticities are lower than they actually are, it would make v1 < 
v*1. Since reforms were recent, their impact on elasticities was not fully understood. In 
addition, political pressures made w, the weight given to inflation in the loss function, 
high. Although the RBI had greater autonomy  after the reforms it was still not fully 
independent of the ministry of finance, which conveys the political pressures. Finally, 
risk aversion or the fear of being caught in policy combination 3 pushed the RBI to adopt 
combination 2 in Figure 1.  
The country was growing faster than it ever had before and the RBI was nervous in its 
first encounter with a gyrating exchange rate. Interest rates were largely administered and 
had been only recently freed; interest elasticities were thought to be low. Liberalization of 
the  forex  market  had  just  begun  in  1995,  and  markets  still  had  a  limited  role  in  the 
determination of the exchange rate. The fiscal deficit was thought to be large. There were 
doubts about the durability of capital inflows and fears of  a possible reversal, which 
would have implied a shock to the risk premium.  
Pre-reform monetary policy followed a money supply targeting approach. But after the 
credit squeeze had a persistent effect on the level and term structure of interest rates the 
RBI shifted to a multiple indicator approach
18. The Bank Rate, which had been frozen, 
was activated as a benchmark for interest rates, and gradually brought down from 11 
percent in 1997 to 6 percent by 2003. A new RBI Governor, Bimal Jalan, demonstrated, 
through staggered placement of government debt, that it was possible for interest rates to 
come  down  despite  high  fiscal  deficits.  But  there  were  reversals  during  periods  of 
exchange rate volatility, sometimes induced by fluctuations in foreign capital inflows. 
The last such episode occurred, from mid-May to early August 2000, when the rupee 
depreciated by about 3 per cent against the dollar, along with a net outflow by foreign 
                                                            
17 The analysis in this section is based on various bi-annual monetary policy statements issued in April and 
October  every  year  by  the  RBI,  speeches  by  RBI  governors  and  data  available  on  the  RBI’s  website 
www.rbi.org.in and on Goyal (1997, 2002, 2005).  
18 The then RBI Governor Dr. Rangarajan announced the new policy in a release function for IGIDR’s 
India Development Report, 1997, which had analyzed monetary policy actions and outcomes (see Goyal 
1997).    27 
institutional investors. The bank rate, the CRR and short-term repurchase rates were all 
increased in July.  
 
Policy  committed  to  a  soft  interest  rate  regime,  since  the  late  nineties,  but  steady 
softening of nominal interest rates occurred only after February 2001, as world interest 
rates fell. The liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) was implemented and domestic short-
term interest rates drifted downwards. This spread to long-term rates, which fell relatively 
more, and flattened the yield curve by 2003. The Bank Rate was reduced steadily from 8 
per cent to 6 per cent in 2004. Markets see what the RBI does, not only what it says, so 
the softened tone, together with the absence of a reversal since 2000, contributed to an 
upswing in activity. The RBI followed policy combination 1 (Figure 1) only after 2001, 
whereas over 1996-2000 it repeatedly reverted to combination 2. A number of short-term 
supply shocks occurred and as our model implies, monetary tightening in the presence of 
supply shocks sustained the slowdown.  
 
After the reforms and devaluation of the early nineties the nominal exchange rate was 
kept more or less fixed; but the RBI said it was a market determined rate even as it kept 
buying forex to keep the Rupee from appreciating as foreign inflows began to flood in. 
After the disturbances in the mid-nineties it said that while the level of the exchange rate 
was market determined, it was intervening in order to lower volatility. Only in 2004 did 
the Policy Statement declare officially that India had a managed float. Long periods of a 
stable exchange rate, with uni-directional changes, encouraged bursts of over-reaction 
and high volatility from markets. Sharp defensive changes in short-term interest rates 
further disturbed financial markets.   
 
The RBI had been holding the exchange rate fixed and then reacting to market volatility 
if it occurred. Dr. Jalan had noted in a monetary policy statement (Jalan, 2002) that such 
sustained one-way movement did encourage market players to bet on that movement and 
enhance it further, and he remarked in his farewell address as RBI governor, to the Indian 
Forex Association in 2003, that in view of the ballooning reserves, there should be some 
rethinking on exchange rate policy.   28 
 
Current international research is supporting managed exchange rate regimes compared to 
the earlier emphasis on pure floats or extreme fixes. To that extent the RBI' s "middling" 
regime, is validated; Indian exchange rate management earned high praise for avoiding 
the fallout from the East Asian crisis and managing the pressures of gradually opening 
the economy without major trauma. Interventions did successfully quell excess volatility 
but led to a steady accumulation of reserves and to one-way movement of the rupee. The 
RBI did not maintain regular limited volatility, or use the exchange rate to counter supply 
shocks. But a middling regime gives some flexibility to achieve other targets. 
  
The RBI is open to ideas and welcomes a debate on exchange rate regimes, but there is a 
genuine fear of excess volatility in shallow Indian forex markets (Jalan, 2003). But our 
analysis suggests that with policy combination 1, fundamentals strengthen and markets 
do  the  work.  Forex  markets  are  now  deep  enough  to  be  effective.  Intervention  or 
signalling is additional ammunition and would be respected, because the RBI has such 
large reserves and size in the market.  
 
Although  the  likelihood  of  the  optimal  combination  1  has  risen,  with  higher  interest 
elasticities and market deepening, supporting institutional changes that reduce the risk of 
outcome  3  would  make  it  self-enforcing.  For  the  RBI  to  keep  v1  =  v*1,  restraint  on 
revenue deficits and populist expenditure is necessary. If fiscal responsibility acts, with 
good incentive features, bind the Centre and the States, and a weak form of inflation 
targeting  stabilizes  inflationary  expectations,  the  RBI  will  be  willing  to  be  less 
overcautious and more transparent.  It will have  more credibility with markets.  Better 
coordination between markets and fiscal and monetary policy would result.  
 
When  there  is  excess  capacity,  a  short-run  tradeoff  between  inflation  and  output 
variability arises only if there is positive cost-push inflation. As long as supply shocks are 
the dominant source of inflation and deviations of output from potential harm welfare, 
optimal policy would aim to achieve an inflation target only over the medium-term. The 
policy complex identified can contribute to reducing fiscal deficits as interest rates fall   29 
and growth rates rise, if the primary deficit is reduced while spending on infrastructure 
and human capital formation is maintained. 
The  suggested  combination  is  politically  feasible  since  in  India  there  is  a  general 
consensus about maintaining a competitive exchange rate and keeping inflation low while 
attempting to reach potential growth levels. The RBI’s explicit objectives, stated in the 
Bi-annual Monetary Policy Statement, are to maximize growth and minimize inflation. 
The policy contributes to both these. Policy authorities have a reluctance to take a public 
position on the exchange rate, but their desire to lower inflation and improve growth may 
push  them  to  do  so.  The  growth  revival  in  2003  demonstrated  the  efficacy  of  lower 
interest rates and higher spending on infrastructure. Building in a rule whereby there is an 
automatic announced response to an expected supply shock would avoid the tendency to 
do nothing until there is a crisis. Better data and estimation of macro models are required 
to provide firmer estimates of the sensitive parameters. 
Since many explanations can be consistent with an outcome, and it is not always possible 
to test alternative hypotheses for historical events, Bates et. al. (1998) give criteria using 
which  an  analytical  narrative  based  on  explicit  theorizing  can  be  subject  to  critical 
appraisal.  
1.  Do the assumptions fit the facts? Our modeling assumptions are chosen to closely 
fit  our  EME’s  structure,  and  the  observed  pattern  of  shocks.  Estimation  and 
structural  VAR  based  tests  (Goyal  and  Pujari,  2005)  support  the  critical 
assumption of long-run elastic supply.  
2.  Do conclusions follow from premises? Once the assumptions are validated, the 
results follow from the logic of the model and are demonstrated in tight algebraic 
derivations. A set of outcomes is derived from policy choices, and choice among 
them  depends  on  parameter  values,  objective  functions,  and  the  institutional 
environment.  
3.  Do its implications find confirmation in the data? The parameters used in the 
analysis and simulations are validated through regressions. The analysis explains 
actual  Indian  macroeconomic  policy  choices  that  led  to  an  endogenous   30 
amplification  of  supply  shocks.  Estimation  of  structural  demand  and  supply 
shocks from the VAR model also demonstrates an amplification of supply shocks 
through reductions in demand, during growth slowdowns. The analysis serves as a 
tool of empirical discovery by pointing out the fine gradations of monetary policy 
with their very different effects. 
4.  How  does  the  analysis  compare  with  alternative  explanations?  Subsuming 
different explanations are strengths of the model. Both demand and supply side is 
modeled. Macroeconomic outcomes are traced to micro decisions. It allows for 
the possibility of a high deficit and excessive credit creation raising inflation and 
therefore interest rates, but then shows why, given structure and shocks, opposite 
effects are more likely.  Both money supply and cost-push effects on inflation are 
modeled.  
5.  Do the results generalize to other cases? In countries that share the crucial feature 
of high productivity growth generating excess capacity, a set of policies similar to 
the ones advocated has worked. Goyal (2002), Goyal and Jha (2004) argue that 
policies suited to structure, that built in good incentives, coordinated monetary 
and fiscal policy, and made possible a countercyclical smoothing of interest rates 
can help to explain high growth episodes in America and China. 
 
7. Conclusion  
We show in a simple open economy macromodel, calibrated to the typical institutions 
and shocks of an emerging market economy, a monetary stimulus preceding a temporary 
supply shock can lower interest rates, raise output, appreciate exchange rates, and lower 
inflation, supported by trader action that maximizes their profits. This helps to maintain 
the required exchange rate regime while permitting a counter-cyclical interest rate. CB 
intervention in forex markets is required only if the exchange rate overshoots the bounds 
set. Model and parameter uncertainty, status-quoism, risk-aversion, and the lack of 
supporting fiscal policy is the reason the opposite policy combination is often chosen. 
Deepening in markets has made optimal policy feasible, and it is compatible with 
political constraints and policy objectives, but further institutional changes and binding   31 
rules can make it self-enforcing, coordinating markets and macroeconomic policy to 
optimal outcomes.  
 
The  analysis  is  used  to  examine  Indian  macropolicy  decisions  in  a  narrative.  The 
economy did well when policy followed the optimal combination.   
 
With limited volatility in exchange rates the CB can achieve four objectives. First, 
stimulate the real sector through a real exchange rate that follows its trend competitive 
value. Second, smooth nominal interest rates and suit them to the domestic cycle. This 
will contribute towards achieving long-run external balance; eventual current account 
surpluses should follow initial deficits.    
 
Second is inflation control. An appreciation is an antidote to price shocks coming from 
food, oil and other intermediate inputs, which are the typical temporary supply shocks the 
economy faces.  For example, when the underlying trend is that of nominal appreciation, 
a steeper short-term appreciation can reduce inflation, and allow interest rates to fall.   
 
Fourth is stability in the external sector, and a fall in the likelihood of currency crises. 
Limited two-way movement of the exchange rate, creates incentives to hedge, reduces 
noise trader entry, and contributes to the deepening of forex markets.  
 
Appendix 
The data is for the period 1995-2004, sourced from the IFS (IMF) and RBI 
(www.rbi.orb.in). All variables are transformed as log changes except interest rates. 
  
To estimate aggregate supply, the log change in wholesale prices dwpi_t is regressed on 
log lagged change in the consumer price index dcpi_t_2, US consumer price index 
duscpi, oil prices, doil, a measure of potential output diippot, and a constant term using 
monthly data. For quarterly data the potential output variable, dgdpq_pot, is based on 
gross domestic output, for which data is available on a quarterly basis, rather than the 
index of industrial production used wit monthly data. Since there are only 36   32 
observations with quarterly data, insignificant variables are dropped so that the F statistic 
and the overall regression are significant. 
 
To estimate aggregate demand log change in industrial production, diip_t, is regressed on 
its own lagged value, diip_t_1, the log change in wholesale prices, dwpi_t, the call money 
rate, cmr, the real long-run loan interest rate, reallr, or the realcmr for quarterly data, one 
period lagged real depreciation zdepre_t_1, and a constant term. 
 










      Source |       SS       df       MS                       Number of obs =     115 
-------------+------------------------------                      F(  4,   110) =    7.52 
       Model |  9.25677214     4  2.31419303              Prob > F      =  0.0000 
   Residual |  33.8634049   110  .307849136           R-squared     =  0.2147 
-------------+------------------------------                   Adj R-squared =  0.1861 
       Total   |  43.1201771   114  .378247167           Root MSE      =  .55484 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      dwpi_t  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   dcpi_t_2 |    .403094   .2182774     1.85   0.067    -.0294806    .8356686 
      diippot |  -.0251534   .0112391    -2.24   0.027    -.0474267   -.0028801 
           doil |  -.0132506   .0069817    -1.90   0.060    -.0270867    .0005855 
      duscpi |   1.025468   .2362588     4.34   0.000     .5572584    1.493678 









   33 
Aggregate Demand 
 
       Source  |       SS       df       MS                         Number of obs =     115 
-      ------------+------------------------------                    F(  5,   109) =    9.58 
         Model|  774.479554     5  154.895911                Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1762.68982   109  16.1714662             R-squared     =  0.3053 
-------------+------------------------------                     Adj R-squared =  0.2734 
       Total   |  2537.16937   114  22.2558717            Root MSE      =  4.0214 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        diip_t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diip_t_1 |   -.495983   .0843416    -5.88   0.000    -.6631452   -.3288207 
         cmr   |   1.463654   1.030982     1.42   0.159    -.5797199    3.507027 
zdepre_t_1 |  -.5829627   29.68394    -0.02   0.984    -59.41557    58.24965 
      reallr    |   1.390563   .5211541     2.67   0.009     .3576524    2.423473 
      dwpi_t |  -.9630594   .7075006    -1.36   0.176    -2.365302    .4391837 












      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      36 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    33) =    4.49 
       Model  |  .000621606     2  .000310803           Prob > F      =  0.0189 
    Residual |  .002284842    33  .000069238           R-squared     =  0.2139 
        -------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1662 
       Total    |  .002906449    35  .000083041           Root MSE      =  .00832 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        dwpi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      dcpi_2 |  -.1376692   .0765234    -1.80   0.081    -.2933572    .0180187 
   dgdpq_pot |  -.0251811   .0129287    -1.95   0.060    -.0514847    .0011225 




   34 
Aggregate Demand 
 
      Source  |       SS       df       MS                      Number of obs =      37 
-------------+------------------------------                      F(  5,    31) =    5.94 
       Model |  .047375432     5  .009475086             Prob > F      =  0.0006 
    Residual |  .049430515    31  .001594533           R-squared     =  0.4894 
-------------+------------------------------                   Adj R-squared =  0.4070 
       Total   |  .096805947    36  .002689054           Root MSE      =  .03993 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        dip_t     |      Coef.          Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
diip_t_1      |  -.3621648   .1563349    -2.32   0.027     -.681012   -.0433177 
  cmr           |  -1.057666    .468229    -2.26   0.031    -2.012626   -.1027071 
zdepre_t_1  |  -.3369933    .316414    -1.07   0.295    -.9823239    .3083372 
realcmr     |   1.099056   .4716428     2.33   0.026     .1371346    2.060978 
 dwpi_t     |  -1.395587   .9426332    -1.48   0.149      -3.3181    .5269261 
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